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ABSTRACT
After an absence of almost half a century, the spectre of deflation is once again haunting the
corridors of central banks and finance ministries in the industrial world. While preventing or
combating deflation poses some unique difficulties not present in preventing or combating inflation,
deflation can be prevented and, if it has taken hold, can be overcome, using conventional
instruments of monetary and fiscal policy. These include open market purchases of government
securities and monetary financing of government deficits caused by expansionary fiscal measures.
Base money-financed tax cuts or transfer payments  n the mundane version of Friedman’s helicopter
drop of money  n will always boost aggregate demand.
Unconventional monetary and fiscal measures are also available. These include open market
purchases of private and foreign securities, negative nominal interest rates (through a carry tax on
currency) and temporary tax measures aimed at shifting private consumption from the future to the
present, by tilting the intertemporal terms of trade. An example is a cut in VAT today coupled to the
credible commitment of a VAT increase in the future.
Deflation results from a combination of bad luck and poor economic management, including
the failure to coordinate monetary and fiscal policy. Sustained unwanted deflation is evidence of
policy failure. Both the knowledge and the tools exist to prevent unwanted deflation.
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Chief Economist and Special Counselor to the President







After an absence of almost half a century, the spectre of deflation is once again 
haunting the corridors of central banks and finance ministries in the industrial world.  
The great deflations of the 19
th century and 1930’s made way for the post-World War 
II era of persistent inflation - low to moderate in the advanced industrial countries, 
moderate to high with occasional bursts of hyperinflation in developing countries, 
transition countries and emerging markets.  The recent renewed concern with 
deflation is due in part to the historical association, at least during the interwar years, 
of deflationary episodes with financial crises, recession, stagnation and even 
depression.  It is also prompted by the fear that in deflationary conditions, nominal 
interest rates may come close to their lower bound of zero, at which point monetary 
policy is thought to lose most if not all of its effectiveness.   
I define deflation to be a sustained decline in the general price level of current 
goods and services, that is, a persistently negative rate of inflation.  In principle, the 
price index is the ideal cost of living index.  Real-world approximations include the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) in the US, the Retail Price Indexes (RPI, RPIX and 
RPIY) in the UK and the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) in the EMU 
area.  For many practical and policy issues, the distinctions between these indices are 
important.  For the purpose of this paper, they are irrelevant.
1   
                                                             
1 There is a widely held view that real-world price indices present us with systematically upward-
biased estimates of true inflation.  This is important for issues ranging from cost-of-living indexation to 
the choice of an appropriate inflation target by the monetary authority.  For reasons of space I will not 
consider these issues here.  A Commission headed by Michael Boskin studied the CPI bias and 
presented the results of its report on December 5, 1996.  It concluded that that CPI inflation in the US 
was likely to overestimate true inflation by about 1.0 percent to 2.0 percent per year.  The sources of 
this bias in CPI inflation identified by the Boskin Commission were: 1. Substitution bias (0.2 - 0.4 
points per year); 2. Outlet bias (0.1 - 0.3 points); 3. Quality changes (0.2 - 0.6 points); 4. New products 
(0.2 - 0.7 points); 5. Formula bias (0.3 - 0.4 points) (see Boskin et. al. [1996, 1997]).  While not every 
aspect of the methodology used by the Commission, or the magnitude of the bias it found, have been 
universally accepted, there is widespread agreement that there was a significant upward bias.  Changes 
made since then by the Bureau of Labour Statistics have probably reduced the magnitude of the bias.   2
What is important is that deflation as used in this paper refers to a declining 
general price level for current goods and services.  It does not refer to asset price 
deflation – a fall in the prices of existing stores of value, either real or financial.  Asset 
price movements are an important part of the transmission mechanism of monetary 
and fiscal policy actions and other shocks.  Asset price movements often complicate 
the task of the monetary and fiscal authorities and prevent the simultaneous 
achievement of price stability, full employment and balanced structure of production 
and demand.  Asset price deflation may at times precede, be associated with or even 
cause downward movement in the general price level of goods and services.  Asset 
price deflation is, however, conceptually quite distinct from deflation in the sense 
used in this paper.   
The timing of the renewal of political concern with and scholarly interest in 
deflation is not surprising.  As shown in Figure 1, in Japan, the central bank discount 
rate has been at 50bps or less since 1995, raising concern about the zero lower bound 
on nominal interest rates, at least at the short end of the maturity spectrum.  Japan is in 
a protracted economic slump that started in 1992.  Money wages have declined in four 
of the past five years; the GDP deflator has declined in each of the past 5 years and 
the CPI in four out of the past 5 years.  Short nominal interest rates in Japan are near 
zero.
2  
Figure 1 here 
                                                             
2  
Percentage annual growth rates of nominal price and wage indices in Japan 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002*   
Nominal 
Compensation** 
-0.7 -1.2 0.5  -0.1 -1.2 
GDP Deflator  -0.1  -1.4 -2.1 -1.2 -1.0 
CPI  0.7  -0.3 -0.7 -0.7 -1.1 
Source: OECD [2002], Annex Table 12.  3
A number of observers have concluded that there is a liquidity trap at work, 
that is, monetary policy is incapable of stimulating aggregate demand (see e.g. 
Krugman [1998a, b, c, d; 1999, 2000], Ito [1998], McKinnon and Ohno [1999], Itoh, 
Motoshige and Naoki Shimoi [2000], Miyal [2000], Iwata, Shigeru and Wu [2001], 
Svensson [2001] and Taylor [2001]); for a view that liquidity traps are unlikely to 
pose a problem, see Meltzer [1999, 2001] and Hondroyiannis, Swamy and Tavlas 
[2000]).   
The risk of the zero lower bound becoming a binding constraint on monetary 
policy has more recently become a factor also in Western Europe and the United 
States of America.  In the Euro area inflation, on the HIPC measure, averaged 1.1 
percent per annum during 1999.  The ECB’s repo rate reached a local trough of 2.5 
percent during April 1999.  At the time, this raised the question as to whether a 
margin of two hundred and fifty basis points provided enough insurance against a 
slump in aggregate demand.  In March 2003 the ECB’s repo rate again stands at 2.50 
percent and HICP inflation runs at just over 2.0 percent per annum (Issing [2002]).   
Figure 2 here 
The UK has its Repo rate at 3.75 percent with RPIX inflation just over 2.5 
percent.
3  While this appears to provide a reasonable cushion against the risk of 
getting stuck at the zero lower bound, the fear of deflation is not completely absent 
even in the UK.   
Figure 3 here 
Finally, in the US too, with the Federal Funds target rate in February 2003 
down at 1.25 per cent, the Fed has shown some concern about the possibility that 
monetary policy could become constrained by the zero lower bound on nominal  4
interest rates (see e.g. Bernanke [2002]).  As early as the Fall of 1999, the Fed 
organised a conference to discuss the ‘zero bound problem’ (see e.g. Clouse, 
Henderson, Orphanides, Small and Tinsley [1999]) and recently its staff have 
produced a thorough study of Japan’s experience in the 1990s and the lessons this 
holds for preventing deflation (Ahearne et. al. [2002]).
4 
Figure 4 here 
There is also a growing number of theoretical contributions on liquidity traps, 
the zero bound problem, low inflation and deflation (see e.g. Akerlof, Dickens and 
Perry [1996], Fuhrer and Madigan [1997], Orphanides and Wieland [1998, 2000], 
Wolman [1998], Porter [1999], Johnson, Small and Tryon [1999], Cristiano [2000], 
Freedman [2000], Goodfriend [2000], Bryant [2000], McCallum [2000, 2002], 
Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe [2001, 2002], Buiter and Panigirtzoglou [2001, 
2003], Feldstein [2002a,b] and Nishizaki and Watanabe [2002]). 
The longest deflationary episode for which we have acceptable quality data is 
also the one that is probably most relevant for today.  It is the great deflation of the 
19
th century, shown, for the UK, in Figures 5 and 6 .   
Figure 5 here 
Figure 6 here 
As Figure 5 shows, the average rate of inflation over this 115-year period was 
slightly negative (certainly if we start our count at the end of the Napoleonic wars), 
and the variability of the inflation rate was high.  Figure 6 shows that Bank Rate did 
                                                                                                                                                                          
3 UK HICP inflation rates are between 0.50 percent and 0.75 percent per annum below its RPIX 
inflation rate. 
4 The proceedings of the conference were published in the Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 
[2002].  5
not fall below 2 per cent throughout 115 years preceding World-War I.
5  The UK got 
through a deflationary century without encountering the zero lower bound constraint 
on nominal interest rates, let alone the liquidity trap.  The deflationary periods 
between the two World Wars are less relevant to our current experience.  Although 
the failure to deal effectively with deflation no doubt prolonged and deepened the 
Great Depression of the 1930s, deflation then was the result of a catastrophic collapse 
of aggregate demand, not the cause of it.  
Figures 5 and 6 demonstrate that deflation is an old phenomenon.  Is it also an 
old  problem?  Deflationary episodes have often, but not always, been periods of 
recession or depression.  Can policy makers prevent deflation or eliminate deflation 
once it has taken hold simply by reversing the policies that have been proven to be 
effective in preventing or eliminating inflation?  
Some of the costs and benefits of deflation are not qualitatively different from 
the costs and benefits of inflation – there is no obvious discontinuity at zero inflation.  
For instance, menu costs (costs of changing prices) apply symmetrically to price 
increases and to price cuts.
6  Anticipated inflation causes welfare losses due to shoe-
leather costs of cash management if the opportunity cost of holding cash (the risk-free 
short nominal interest rate) increases with the expected rate of inflation.  Deflation 
reduces the opportunity cost of holding non-interest bearing cash.  Bailey [1956] and 
Friedman’s [1969] optimal quantity of money theorem is the proposition that welfare 
is maximised when the opportunity cost of holding money is zero, that is, when the 
risk-free nominal interest rate is zero.  If welfare is maximised when the expected rate 
of inflation equals minus the short real interest rate, and if the short real interest rate is 
                                                             
5 The temporary collapse in the external value of the U.S. dollar starting in 1861 reflects the 
exceptional circumstances of the American Civil War and its aftermath, the Greenback period.   6
positive, deflation characterises the optimal monetary rule.  In a Bailey--Friedman 
world, deflation is not a problem, it is part of the solution.  
Unanticipated inflation redistributes wealth from creditors whose contracts are 
nominally denominated and not index-linked to debtors.  Unanticipated deflation 
redistributes wealth from debtors to creditors.  If and to the extent that higher inflation 
is associated with greater uncertainty about relative prices, higher inflation increases 
the noise-to-signal ratio of the price signals sent and received by households and 
enterprises.  The same may well apply if the rate of deflation increases in absolute 
value.  
There are four reasons why deflation is not just inflation with the sign 
reversed.  First, there is the problem of a zero lower bound on risk-free nominal 
interest rates caused by the existence of stores of value with a risk-free zero nominal 
interest rate.  These are coin and currency and commercial bank reserves with the 
central bank.
7  The zero nominal interest rate on base money (high-powered money, 
the monetary liabilities of the central bank) sets a zero floor under risk-free nominal 
interest rates for all other stores of value, private and public.  If in order to stimulate 
demand lower real interest rates are required but nominal interest rates are already at 
their zero lower bound, conventional monetary policy is powerless.  Nominal interest 
rates are more apt to hit the zero floor when there is deflation.   
Second, redistributions from debtors to creditors associated with unexpectedly 
high deflation in a world with imperfectly index-linked debt contracts is more likely 
to lead to default and bankruptcy than redistributions from creditors to debtors 
associated with unexpectedly high inflation.  Default, bankruptcy and corporate 
                                                                                                                                                                          
6 Menu costs do not, of course, attach only to changes in the prices of goods and services included in 
the CPI or GDP deflator.  They presumably apply also to changes in money wages and intermediate 
goods and services and even to changes in the prices of existing assets.  7
restructuring are not just mechanisms for redistributing ownership and control of 
assets.  These processes also destroy real resources.   
‘Debt deflation’, the increase in the real value of nominal debt caused by a 
falling general price level was considered an important source of financial distress by 
the great monetary economists of the 19
th century and the first half of the 20
th century.  
Irving Fisher [1932, 1933a] went as far as arguing that the interaction of deflation and 
large accumulations of private nominal debt could account for every major recession 
in the USA.  Borrowers with short-maturity nominal liabilities and illiquid and/or real 
or foreign currency-denominated assets are especially vulnerable to deflationary 
shocks.  Commercial banks fit that description, and the incidence of banking crises 
and bank defaults during the Great Depression of the 1930s and other severe 
recessions are consistent with a role for debt deflation in the propagation of the 
business cycle (see e.g. Fisher [1932, 1933a], Keynes [1931, 1936] and Haberler 
[1937]).  Homeowners with mortgages or households with significant outstanding 
unsecured consumer debt have similar vulnerabilities in their portfolios, as do highly 
indebted enterprises, (see Minsky [1975, 1986] and King [1994]). 
Hyman Minsky’s theory of financial fragility, distress and instability (Minsky 
[1975, 1986]) and modern theories of asymmetric information, adverse selection, 
moral hazard and agency problems in financial markets (see e.g. Bernanke [1983], 
Bernanke and Gertler [1995] and King [1994]) have sharpened our understanding of 
the links between balance sheet revaluations, access to credit and other sources of 
external finance, investment and consumption demand and fluctuations in output and 
employment.
                                                                                                                                                                          
7 There are countries where commercial bank reserves with the central bank are remunerated, 
sometimes with close-to-market interest rates.  8
Third, there is a widely-held view that there exists an asymmetry in nominal 
wage and price adjustment.  According to this view, the degree of downward rigidity 
in some nominal prices, and especially in money wages, is not matched by a similar 
degree of upward nominal rigidity.
8  This means that disinflation, the process of 
bringing down the rate of inflation through a reduction in the growth rate of nominal 
demand will be more costly, in terms of output and employment foregone (that is, the 
sacrifice ratio will be higher) when the inflation rate falls into the negative range than 
when it remains in the positive range.  
Fourth, in living memory, there has been considerable experience of inflation, 
and even of hyperinflation, while there has been only limited experience of deflation 
(and none of hyperdeflation).  This fourth point will turn out to be relevant also to the 
interpretation of the third point. 
The proximate cause of deflation is the failure of nominal demand to grow at 
least at the rate of growth of potential output.  It may therefore be descriptively correct 
that recent deflationary episodes have been the result of faster than expected 
productivity growth in some (significant) parts of the world – the USA and emerging 
Asia (China, India etc.) are often mentioned in this context.  Even if, in an accounting 
sense, a reduction in inflation is associated mainly with an increase in real GDP 
growth driven by higher productivity growth rather than with a reduction in nominal 
GDP growth, such a diagnosis does not absolve the monetary and fiscal policy 
authorities.  Whatever the supply-side of the economy may generate by way of a 
growth rate of potential output, it is always possible to use monetary and fiscal policy 
to generate any growth rate of nominal demand and therefore any rate of inflation, in 
                                                             
8 Note that menu costs do not produce such asymmetries.  9
the medium term.
9  Sustained deflation is therefore either a policy choice, or the result 
of policy failure. 
 
1. Three Preliminary Questions 
1.1 Why don’t we see negative nominal interest rates? 
Financial instruments, henceforth securities,  can be divided into two 
categories: bearer securities and registered securities.  Registered securities are 
financial instruments for which the identity of the owner is known to the issuer and 
can be verified by third parties.  Bearer securities are financial instruments for which 
the owner is anonymous - the identity of the owner is unknown to the issuer and 
cannot be verified by third parties. 
  Paying interest, at a positive or a negative rate on registered securities is a 
simple task.  Take, for instance, checking accounts or deposit accounts.  The bank 
knows the owner of each account.  Payment of interest at any rate, positive, zero or 
negative, is administratively straightforward.  The bank periodically credits or debits 
the account.
10 
  With bearer securities, paying any non-zero interest rate is administratively 
non-trivial.  If the interest rate is positive, care must be taken that the interest due is 
paid only once during a given payment period.  Since the identity of the owner is 
unknown to the issuer, the same security could be presented multiple times during any 
                                                             
9 Former Governor Hayami [2002] of the Bank of Japan shows an appreciation of the relationship 
between technological change, changes in market structure, relative price changes and inflation in the 
following quote “At the same time, the basic relationships between structural reforms and prices must 
be correctly understood. The recent price decline is attributable to various factors such as 
technological innovation, deregulation, and an increase in low-priced imports. But above all, the 
major factor is that Japan's economy was not able to achieve a full-scale recovery in the 1990s and 
that the negative output gap expanded due to lack of demand.” 
10 Positive nominal interest rates on bank accounts have been common for decades.  During the 1970s, 
the Swiss authorities taxed non-resident holders of Swiss bank accounts by paying a negative nominal 
interest rate during the 1970s.  After allowing for bank fees, the net nominal rate of return on many 
checking accounts with a (low) positive nominal interest rate is frequently negative.  10
given payment period, either by the same holder or by a sequence of different holders.  
The way around this is to identify, label or mark the security rather than the owner.  
The security in question is marked in a verifiable manner by the issuer or his agent, 
whenever the security is presented for payment of interest due.  Historically, bearer 
securities had coupons attached to them that were cut off (clipped) one at a time 
whenever an interest payment was made.
11  Other ways of identifying bearer 
securities as being ‘ex-interest’
12, such as stamping, or more high-tech identification 
methods can no doubt be thought of. 
  If the interest rate on the bearer security is negative, the issuer faces the 
opposite problem of the holder not presenting himself to pay the issuer the negative 
interest due on the security.  The solution is to find a way first of identifying the 
bearer security as being ex-interest and second to ensure that securities that are not ex-
interest are unattractive to potential owners.   
The reason for the second condition becomes clear when one considers the 
bearer security that is of special interest for this paper: currency, that part of the 
monetary liabilities of the central bank that is generally accepted as means of payment 
and medium of exchange in the central bank’s jurisdiction.
13 
14  Today, currency is 
fiat money.  It has no intrinsic value as a consumer good, a capital good or an 
intermediate input, other than the value of the paper it is printed on.  It has value 
today if and only if the public believe it will have value tomorrow.  For the issuer (the 
central bank) to put an expiry date on a bank note would be ineffective if the public 
chose to ignore it.  To make paying negative interest on currency possible it must (a) 
                                                             
11 This would be problematic for a bearer perpetuity such as the British Consols.   
12 I use ‘ex-interest’ analogously with ‘ex-dividend’ for common stock.  A security is ex-interest for a 
given payment period if the interest due on it (positive or negative) has been paid. 
13 And at times are accepted outside that jurisdiction, as with the US dollar and the Euro today. 
14 The monetary liabilities of the central bank consist of currency in circulation and commercial bank 
balances with the central bank.  Banks’ balances with the central bank are registered securities.  The  11
be possible to identify bank notes as being ex-interest and (b) be possible to attach a 
sufficiently severe penalty to holding money that is not ex-interest after the date the 
interest is due.  Fines, and, in the limit, confiscation or worse, would be required to 
enforce negative interest on currency. 
The idea of taxing currency is not new.  It goes back at least to Gesell and the 
Social Credit movement in the second and third decades of the 20
th century.  No less 
an economist than Irving Fisher viewed the idea sympathetically.  (See Gesell [1949], 
Fisher [1933b], Porter [1999]).  It has recently been revived and proposed by Buiter 
and Panigirtzoglou [2001, 2003] and by Goodfriend [2000].  Taxing currency by 
paying negative interest on it would be a costly administrative exercise.  These costs 
must be set against the cost of being stuck at the zero nominal interest rate floor or the 
cost of pursuing a sufficiently high inflation target to minimise the risk of the zero 
nominal interest rate floor becoming a binding constraint. 
 
1.2 Do asymmetric, downward nominal price and wage rigidities make deflation 
particularly costly? 
Conventional economic theory has a rather easy time explaining real rigidities, 
but a hard time explaining any kind of nominal rigidities, let alone asymmetric 
nominal rigidities.  Empirically there appear to be important nominal rigidities, but 
mainstream economic theory does a poor job explaining why the numéraire matters.  
A fortiori, mainstream economic theory has little to say about asymmetries in the 
incidence and or severity of nominal rigidities.  For instance, menu costs do not 
generate asymmetries between upward and downward price adjustments, although 
they can account for the spike in the frequency distribution of individual price 
                                                                                                                                                                          
identity of the owner is known to the issuer.  Any interest rate, positive or negative, can be charged on 
it with negligible administrative expense.  12
changes at zero.  Neither do other state-contingent or time-contingent contracting 
stories.
15   
Nominal price rigidity, symmetric or asymmetric, has never been attributed to 
nominal asset prices, or to the prices of freely traded homogeneous commodities.  Its 
domain has never been argued to encompass more than the money prices of highly 
processed goods and services and to money wages.  With nominal price cuts 
becoming more frequent in the low inflation environment of the last ten years (see e.g. 
the divergent behaviour of prices for goods and prices for services in the UK, shown 
in Table 1), those who argue for the importance of asymmetric downward nominal 
rigidity are focussing mainly on the labour markets (see e.g. Bewley [1999]).   
Table 1 here 
There is no coherent theory of asymmetric nominal rigidity in the labour 
market.  Arguments based on fairness (Kahneman, Knetch and Thaler [1986], justice 
and morale miss the point, since fairness, justice and morale should concern real 
wages and/or relative real wages, over time and across reference groups, not money 
wages (see Blinder [1995], Akerlof, Dickens and Perry [1996], Card and Hyslop 
[1997] and OECD [2002]).  Detailed micro-data based empirical studies for the UK, 
include Smith [2000] and Nickell and Quintini [2003] for the UK and McLaughlin 
[1994] for the US.  The observation, painstakingly documented in hundreds of 
interviews by Bewley [1999], that both workers and managers will strongly resist 
money wage cuts can plausibly be attributed to the fact that the interviewees (in the 
1990s) had known only positive inflation rates during their working lives.  When 
nominal prices and wages have on average been rising for more than forty years, a 
                                                             
15 Surveys on price setting by supermarkets and other firms show a marked bunching of the frequency 
distribution of price changes at zero, for instance - but such observations tell us nothing about the 
existence of asymmetries in the degrees of downward and upward nominal price stickiness or rigidity.   
  13
nominal wage cut is likely to be a real wage cut also.  Resisting a cut in money wages 
is a pretty good first stab at (indeed almost certainly a necessary condition for) 
resisting a real wage cut and, in decentralised labour markets, a relative wage cut. 
Nickell and Quintini [2003], using a unique UK micro-date set on nominal 
wage changes for the period 1975-99, find that the proportion of individuals whose 
nominal wages fall from one year to the next is large (reaching 20 percent in periods 
of low inflation).  They also find that there is evidence of some rigidity at a nominal 
wage change of zero.  However, while this causes a statistically significant distortion 
in the distribution of real wage changes, the magnitude of the impact is “very 
modest”.
16   
The policy relevance of even this very modest estimated impact is contingent 
on the degree of downward nominal wage rigidity being ‘structural’, that is, invariant 
under changes in the long-run rate of inflation.  With high and even moderate inflation 
becoming a thing of the past throughout the industrial world, any nominal rigidities, 
and asymmetries in downward and upward nominal wage rigidity due to memories 
acquired and mental reference frames constructed during inflationary episodes will 
become less important as time passes.  Finally, the spike in the empirical frequency 
distribution of contract wage changes at zero is, at most, evidence of nominal wage 
rigidity, not of asymmetric nominal wage rigidity.  I conclude that while there is 
convincing empirical evidence that nominal price and wage rigidities exist, there is no 




1.3 How can we disentangle the effects of monetary and fiscal policy? 
The distinction between monetary and fiscal policy instruments is an 
unimportant definitional issue.  It sometimes gets tangled up with important issues 
involving the institutional arrangements for the decentralisation and delegation of the 
fiscal, financial and monetary management activities of the state.  To understand the 
economic fundamentals that determine how monetary and fiscal policy affect 
aggregate demand, one should think of the central bank and the general government 
sector as a single, consolidated unit – the state, or the sovereign.  The balance sheet, 
budget constraint and solvency constraint that matter are the balance sheet, budget 
constraint and solvency constraint of the consolidated general government and central 
bank.  When we consider the practical, operational aspects of implementing certain 
policies in a specific country, it is indeed helpful to consider the particular 
institutional arrangements in that country.  Often we will have to focus on the central 
bank as a separate agency of the state, with a distinct legal personality, charged with 
the management of the legal tender liabilities of the state and frequently also with the 
management of the official international foreign exchange reserves. 
I could define monetary policy as ‘whatever the central bank does’, but a 
slightly more restrictive definition will turn out to be more useful in framing the 
analysis and organising the argument.   
I consider four potential monetary instruments, one of them unconventional, 
the other three conventional.
17  The unconventional monetary instrument is the 
nominal interest rate on base money (conventionally zero on coin and currency, but 
                                                                                                                                                                          
16 They calculate that, if long-run inflation were to rise from 2.5 percent to 5.5 percent per annum, the 
equilibrium unemployment rate would fall from around 6 percent to around 5.87 percent (Nickell and 
Quintini [2003]). 
17 I restrict the analysis to monetary and fiscal policy in reasonably well-functioning market economies.  
Quantitative credit controls and other government-imposed forms of credit rationing are not  15
not necessarily on the other component of the monetary base, commercial bank 
reserves held with the central bank).  The three conventional monetary policy 
instruments are (1) the short risk-free nominal interest rate on non-monetary financial 
claims, henceforth the short nominal interest rate (in the UK this would be the 2-week 
Repo rate; in the US the Federal Funds rate, although the Fed does not peg that rate 
exactly); (2) the stock of base money; and (3), the nominal spot exchange rate (the 
relative price of foreign currency in terms of domestic currency).  Of these four 
monetary instruments, the interest rate on base money will, except in Section 3.4c, be 
treated as a policy instrument whose value is set equal to zero.  Out of the short 
nominal interest rate, the quantity of base money and the exchange rate, only one can 
be chosen independently by the authorities if there is unrestricted international capital 
mobility and the country is small in global capital markets.
18   
In practice, countries either have a managed exchange rate (the exchange rate 
is the policy instrument) or they use the short nominal interest rate as the monetary 
instrument.  I know of no country that uses (or used) the monetary base as the policy 
instrument, although in principle it is possible.  Only when, in Section 4.3, I consider 
a rigorous version of Friedman’s ‘helicopter drop of money’, is the stock of base 
money treated as a policy instrument.   
I define a conventional monetary policy action as any change in the quantity of 
base money, in the short nominal interest rate, or in the exchange rate which, at given 
prices and activity levels, does not change the financial net worth of the state (the 
consolidated general government and central bank), now or in the future. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
considered.  Changes in deposit reserve requirements are best viewed as fiscal measures (changes in the 
taxation of deposit-taking activities). 
18 A ‘small’ country in a particular market is a price taker in that market.  All countries except the US, 
can for practical policy purposes be treated as small in global capital markets.     16
Conventional monetary policy is therefore a subset of the state’s financial 
portfolio management.  The state’s financial portfolio management comprises any 
changes in the composition of the government’s portfolio of financial assets and 
liabilities which, at given prices and activity levels do not change the financial net 
worth of the state now or in the future.  This includes the sale and purchase of long-
dated government debt instruments financed by matching changes in shorter-maturity 
instruments, changes in the currency composition of the government’s financial assets 
and liabilities (including sterilised and non-sterilised foreign exchange market 
intervention, changes in the mix of nominal and index-linked debt, public debt 
retirement financed through privatisation of state assets, swaps, trading in contingent 
claims markets etc).   
Monetary policy involves a subset of such asset swaps.  For our purposes, it 
always includes issuance or retirement (contraction) of base money financed through 
the purchase or sale of government interest-bearing debt (generally of a short 
maturity) or of foreign exchange reserves.  Sterilised foreign exchange market 
intervention (purchases or sales of foreign in exchange for non-monetary liabilities of 
the government that do not alter the monetary base) also are generally conducted by 
the central bank.  Note, however, that in the UK, most of the foreign exchange 
reserves are owned by the general government (the Treasury), although the Bank of 
England manages them as agent of the government.  Most debt management 
operations not involving changes in the monetary base are no longer conducted by the 
Bank of England.   
Fiscal policy includes any change in public spending or tax rules, regardless of 
whether they alter, at given prices and activity levels, the sequence of net financial 
balances of the state.  17
2. A Model of Aggregate Demand and Money Demand  
The purpose of this Section is to present a simple formal model to guide the 
discussion of the conditions under which monetary and fiscal policy, conventional and 
unconventional, can or cannot stimulate aggregate demand.  Monetary (and fiscal) 
policy ineffectiveness concerns the inability of monetary and fiscal policy to influence 
nominal aggregate demand.  How a change in nominal aggregate demand is translated 
into changes in real GDP or in the general price level, depends on the details of the 
specification of the ‘supply side’ of the economy.  As regards the key issues involved 
in preventing or curing deflation, the details of the determination of equilibrium prices 
quantities are irrelevant.  Any combination of real output and general price level 
increases (including the two extremes of real output only and price level only) would 
be satisfactory.  The paper therefore does not try to determine how any change in 
aggregate demand affects the general price level of prices of goods and services, real 
output and employment, asset prices or other variable of interest.
19  The detailed 
derivation of the decision rules of Section 2 can be found in Buiter [2003]. 
  There are two goods, domestic output and imports.  Aggregate demand for 
domestic output, e, is the sum of private consumption demand for domestic output, 
H c , private investment demand for domestic output,  H ι , government spending on 
domestic output,  H g  and export demand, x, that is,  




                                                             
19 In Buiter and Panigirtzoglou [2001, 2003], a simple continuous time, closed, endowment economy, 
represent agent version of the aggregate demand and money demand model developed here is 
combined with an old Keynesian (in Buiter and Panigirtzoglou [2001]) and a New Keynesian Phillips 
curve (in Buiter and Panigirtzoglou [2003]). 
20 For brevity’s sake, we do not differentiate between public consumption spending and public sector 
investment.   
21  ,,, a n d  
HH H ec g x ι  are all measured in units of domestic output.  18
2.1 Households 
There is a composite private consumption good that is a constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) function of the consumption of domestic output and imports.   
Consumption of imports is denoted  F c , and aggregate consumption, measured in 






≡+ .  The domestic currency price of domestic 
output is P , the foreign currency price of imports is 
* P  and S  is the spot price of 
foreign currency in terms of domestic currency, or the nominal spot exchange rate.  
Let  0 θ >  be the static elasticity of substitution between private consumption of 
domestic output and of imports, and let 01 η <≤ .  The CES price index for the private 
domestic consumption bundle, P % , is given by 




















Private consumption of domestic output is related to aggregate private 
consumption of the composite commodity as follows: 
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%  (3) 
The home country is fully specialised in the production of the domestic good.  
Domestic households supply the labour used in domestic production and own the 
domestic capital stock.  There are four stores of value, base money, M , issued by the 
central bank, with a one-period nominal interest rate  M i , one period nominal domestic 
government bonds, B , with a one-period nominal interest rate i, one-period foreign 
bonds, 
* B , with a one-period nominal interest rate 
* i  and the capital stock, K .  The  19
nominal value of a unit of installed capital is  K P .  All non-monetary stores of value 
are perfect substitutes in private portfolios and earn the same expected rate of return.  
Money yields direct utility (‘convenience services’) in addition to being a store of 
value. 
  Domestic output equals domestic value added in our model, which does not 
have imported intermediate or raw materials inputs.  The proportional rate of change 









 is therefore also the GDP-deflator 











.  Let Ω  be the nominal value of the dividend paid out to 
shareholders per unit of capital and let ξ  be the proportional rate of depreciation of 
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 (5) 
There are two kinds of consumers.  The first group always consumes its 
current disposable income.  It neither saves nor borrows.  This group is meant to 
capture the behaviour of consumers who are cash-flow constrained or liquidity-
constrained; they have no liquid assets that they can draw down to finance 
consumption, nor can they obtain consumption loans.  We refer to them as 
‘Keynesian’ consumers.  The aggregate real wage bill (measured in domestic output) 
is denoted w and real aggregate taxes on labour income τ .  For simplicity, everyone  20
currently alive is assumed to earn the same wage and pay the same taxes.  Aggregate 
consumption by Keynesian consumers, 
K c  is given by  
  () 0 1
K cw λτ λ =− ≤ ≤  (6) 
where λ  is the fraction of the household population that is liquidity-constrained.   
The second group of households has access to perfect financial markets.   
These ‘permanent income’ consumers can lend and borrow freely subject only to the 
constraint that the present value of their consumption programme not exceed the value 
of their initial net financial resources plus the present discounted value of their future 
after-tax labour income.  Formally, we model these households using the discrete time 
version of the Yaari-Blanchard overlapping generations model (Yaari [1965], 
Blanchard [1985]) as generalised by Buiter [1988, 1990].  There is a constant birth 
rate  0 β ≥ , and a constant death rate, 10 δ ≥≥ .  There are perfect annuities markets, 
so no-one leaves involuntary bequests.  The individual’s probability of death is also 
the fraction of each age cohort (and therefore of the population as a whole) that dies in 
any given period.  The probability of death raises both the effective subjective 
discount rate and the market rate of interest earned by surviving households.  There is 
no other uncertainty.  Agents have rational expectations.  The aggregate consumption 
of this group, 
P c , is proportional to its comprehensive wealth, the sum of its financial 
wealth, 
P a , and its human wealth, 
P h  
  ()
PP P ca h µ =+  (7) 
In the model, all financial wealth, a, is owned by permanent income 
consumers, so 
P aa = .  The human wealth of a Keynesian consumer is the 
same as that of a permanent income consumer; the difference between them is 
that the Keynesian consumer cannot borrow against the discounted value of  21
his future after-tax wage income.  If economy-wide human wealth is denoted 
h, it follows that  (1 )
P hh λ =− .  Equation (7) can be rewritten as  
  [ ] (1 )
P ca h µ λ =+ −  (8) 
Economy-wide aggregate consumption is given by: 
 [( 1) ]( )
PK cc c a h w µ λλ τ =+= + − + −  (9) 
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Human wealth is the present discounted value of future after-tax labour 
income.  Aggregate labour income is assumed not to be risky, so the appropriate 
discount rate is the risk-free real interest rate.  Current consumption can only be 
driven by the human wealth owned by those currently alive.  We calculate this by 
discounting future aggregate after-tax labour income at a higher rate than the risk-free 
rate of interest.  The difference is the birth rate, β , the rate at which ‘new entrants’ 
arrive to join the future labour force and the future cohorts of tax payers.   
Note that the government will tax both current and future generations.  The 
birth rate does not enter the government’s intertemporal budget constraint.  If current 
generations were linked to future generations through an operative chain of 
intergenerational gifts and bequests, the birth rate will also be absent from the human 
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  The marginal propensity to consume out of comprehensive wealth, µ is given 
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The expression for the marginal propensity to consume out of comprehensive 
wealth in (13) simplifies when future real and nominal interest rates are expected to 
be constant.  In that case, we get 
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 (14) 
When  1 ϕ σ ==  (logarithmic intertemporal preferences and a unitary elasticity 
of substitution between the composite consumption good and real money balances), 
the marginal propensity to consume out of comprehensive wealth simplifies to the 
expression given in equation (15) below. 
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Assuming that only permanent income consumers hold money balances, the 
demand for money is given by 
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 (16) 
The parameter  0 ρ >  is the subjective rate of time preference.  The 
intertemporal substitution elasticity is  0 σ >  and  0 ϕ >  is the static elasticity of 
substitution between the composite consumption good and real money balances. 
The demand for real base money depends negatively on the financial 
opportunity cost of holding money, that is, the excess of the short nominal interest 
rate over the short nominal interest on base money.  The aspect of equation (16) that 
matters most is the second line, constraining the nominal interest rate on non-
monetary financial claims to be at least as high as the nominal interest rate on base 
money.  This floor on the nominal interest rate will be present as long as the non-
pecuniary marginal utility of money does not become negative.  A simple arbitrage 
argument then suffices to establish the floor.  Consider the case where  0 M i = .  If the 
short nominal interest rate on non-monetary assets could be negative, there would be 
risk-free way of making infinite profits by borrowing at the negative rate of interest 
and investing in base money.  Our money demand function also has the property that 
the non-pecuniary marginal utility of money goes to zero only as the real stock of 
money balances relative to consumption goes to infinity, but that is not important for 
anything that follows.  
 
2.2 The government 
The government’s budget identity is given in equation (17) below and its 
intertemporal budget constraint or solvency constraint in equation (18).  Note that 
government here means the consolidated general government and central bank.    24
Government non-monetary debt refers to general government debt held outside the 
central bank.
23  The government spends  H g  on domestic output,  F g  on foreign 
output, raises taxes T  in nominal terms, issues base money with a nominal interest 
rate  M i , issues domestic currency-denominated debt with a nominal interest rate i and 
holds foreign exchange reserves 
* D  that earn a nominal interest rate 
* i .
24  We shall 
call 
* () () () () StD t Bt Mt −−  the financial net worth of the government.  Assuming 
only households pay taxes to the government, we have 
T
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We assume that government spending decisions can be represented by an 
exogenous sequence of aggregate public spending measured in domestic output, 
{() ; } g jjt ≥ .  International relative prices then distribute this aggregate across 
domestic goods and imports according to equation (19) with  ˆ ˆ 01 , 0 ηθ << > , 
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23 In general, it would also include central bank non-monetary liabilities held outside the general 
government.  We ignore this in what follows. 
24 We assume for simplicity that the government earns the same interest rate on its international 
reserves as the private sector does on its foreign-currency-denominated securities.  25
Forward-looking permanent income consumers internalise the government’s 
intertemporal budget constraint.  In equation (20) below, private aggregate 
consumption is represented after interest-bearing government debt is eliminated from 
the consumption function of the permanent income consumers given in (8), using (11) 
and the government’s intertemporal budget constraint (18).  It aggregates the 
behaviour of the permanent income consumers who fully internalise the future taxes 
and monetary issuance decisions of the government, and the behaviour of the myopic 
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The real value of a unit of capital carried into period t is (from equation (4)) 
given by the present discounted value of the future dividend stream: 
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2.3 Private investment 
There is a composite private investment good, ι% , represented by a CES 
function of domestic output and imports.  The price index for the composite 
investment good is, with 0 1 and 0 ηθ <≤ > ,  
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There are quadratic internal adjustment costs associated with investment.   
Both the production function and the adjustment cost function are constant returns to 
scale.  Private investment can therefore be represented as a function of ‘Tobin’s q’.  
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Private investment demand for imports is denoted  F ι . 
2.4 Export demand 
  Without modelling the rest of the world in any detail, we want to specify 
export demand for domestic output,  x, analogously to the import demand functions 
implicit in our specification of consumption, public spending and private investment.  
We therefore assume that the home country takes as given aggregate spending in the 
rest of the world in terms of foreign output, and that the ideal price index for foreign 
spending (the price, in terms of foreign currency) of some appropriate foreign  27
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* f  denote aggregate rest-of-the-world demand measured in foreign 
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In the next Section, we study the effects of monetary and fiscal policy on 
aggregate demand using the model developed in this Section as a benchmark, but 
going beyond it where necessary. 
  
3. Monetary Policy and Aggregate Demand 
  The model of aggregate demand for domestic output is summarised in 
equations (1), (3), (18), (19), (20), (21), (23), (24) and (25).  In the formal model, the 
effect of conventional monetary policy on aggregate demand for domestic output 
means the effect on current aggregate demand for domestic output,  () et , of changes in 
the current short nominal interest rate,  ( 1) it+ ,
26 and/or credible announcements about 
changes in one or more future short nominal interest rates,  () , 1 ij j t >+, holding 
constant all other (expected) future short nominal interest rates.  Also held constant 
are the initial values of all asset stocks (money,  () M t , government debt,  () B t , net 
private holdings of foreign debt, 
*() B t , foreign exchange reserves, 
*() Dt and the 
domestic capital stock,  () K t ), and current and future (anticipated) values of (1) the  28
domestic general price level { } () , P jj t ≥ ;
27 (2) the nominal exchange rate 
{ } () , Sj j t ≥ ;(3) real wage income { } () , wj j t ≥ ; (4) real tax revenues 
{ } () , jj t τ ≥ ; (5) aggregate real public spending { } () , g jj t ≥ ; (6) aggregate real 
spending in the rest of the world { }
*() , f jj t ≥ ; (7) nominal interest rates on base 
money  { } () , M ijjt ≥ ; (8) foreign nominal interest rates 
* {() , } ijjt ≥ ; (9) foreign 
prices 
* {( ) , } P jjt ≥ ; (10) capital rental rates { } () , jj t Ω≥ ; (11) seigniorage 
(1 ) , M jj t ∆+≥. 
 
3.1 A cut in the current short nominal rate of interest 
As long as the lower bound on the nominal interest rate is not binding 
(( 1 ) ( 1 ) M it i t +> +) the monetary authorities can reduce the current short nominal rate 
of interest,  (1 ) it+ .  A reduction in the current short nominal interest rate  (1 ) it+ will 
boost both private consumption demand and investment demand (because we allow 
for endogenous changes in the value of capital,  K P ). 
 For  nt ≥   
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In general, consumption demand is affected by changes in real interest rates 
through three channels: the income effect, the substitution effect and the revaluation 
effect.  In our model, the income and substitution effect work through the marginal 
                                                                                                                                                                          
26 Note that  () it  is predetermined in period t. 
27 and therefore also current and anticipated future values of domestic inflation rates, { } () , jj t π ≥ .  29
propensity to spend out of comprehensive wealth, µ.  It is clear from equation (13) 
that the marginal propensity to spend out of comprehensive wealth will be 
independent of current and future real interest rates if and only if (1) income and 
substitution effects of a real interest rate change cancel each other exactly, that is, if 
1 σ =  and (2) the income effect and substitution effect of a change in  M ii − , the 
opportunity cost of holding base money, cancel each other out, that is, if  1 ϕ = .  In our 
model this will be the case if the period utility function is logarithmic in a Cobb-
Douglas function of aggregate consumption and real money balances (see Buiter 
[2003]).   
  From equation (13), ceteris paribus, a lower real rate of interest (in the current 
period or anticipated in the future) will raise (lower) the marginal propensity to 
consume out of comprehensive wealth if and only if  1 σ >  ( 1 σ < ).
28  Also, ceteris 
paribus, a lower nominal rate of interest (in the current period or anticipated in the 
future) will raise (lower) the marginal propensity to consume out of comprehensive 
wealth if and only if  1 ϕ <  ( 1 ϕ > ).
29 
This is intuitively obvious: if there is a sufficiently strong willingness to shift 
consumption between the present and the future in response to changes in 
intertemporal relative prices, a cut in current or anticipated future real interest rates 
will boost consumption.  Also, if the elasticity of real money demand with respect to 
                                                             
28 For instance, from equation (14), the steady-state effect of a permanent change in the real interest 
rate on the marginal propensity to consume (holding constant the nominal interest rate) is
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29 For instance, from equation (14), the steady-state effect of a permanent change in the nominal 
interest rate, holding constant the real interest rate, is given by   30
the nominal interest rate is less than unity (in absolute value), a lower nominal interest 
rate will raise the share of consumption of the composite commodity in total spending 
on the composite commodity and the services provided by money balances.   
In our Sidrauski-type model, money is not super-neutral unless both the 
intertemporal substitution elasticity and the elasticity of substitution between the 
composite consumption good are equal to one.
30  When only the elasticity of 
substitution between money and consumption is unity, there will be no steady-state 
nominal interest rate effect on the marginal propensity to consume (equation (14)), but 
there will be temporary effects.  Only when both the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution and the elasticity of substitution between money and consumption are 
unity ( 1 σ ϕ == , see equation (13)) will there be neither steady-state nor dynamic 
effects of the nominal rate of interest on the marginal propensity to consume.   
There is no consensus on the magnitude of the intertemporal substitution 
elasticity.  Empirical studies based on the representative agent, time-separable 
expected utility paradigm in which the constant of relative risk aversion is the 
reciprocal of the intertemporal substitution elasticity, typically find that the 
intertemporal substitution elasticity is close to zero (or equivalently, that the degree of 
relative risk aversion is very high).  Examples are Hansen and Singleton [1983], Hall 
[1988] and Yogo [2002].  Allowing the period felicity function to be non-separable in 
consumption and leisure can raise the (implied) estimate of the elasticity of 
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30 See Sidrauski [1967] and Fischer [1979a,b] for a similar result for the case where money is separable 
from consumption in the direct utility function.  31
intertemporal substitution to around 0.35 which, while significantly different from 
zero is also significantly below one (see Basu and Kimball [2000]).   
There have been four distinct approaches that attempt to rebut this finding.  
Mulligan [2002] argues that earlier studies measured rates of return incorrectly and 
that making the appropriate corrections yields results consistent with an intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution of one.  The second rejects the representative agent 
assumption and models heterogeneous consumers/portfolio holders.  For instance, 
Guvenen [2003], permits the intertemporal elasticity of substitution to increase with 
household wealth and assumes that many low wealth consumers do not participate in 
the financial markets at all (rather like the Keynesian consumers of this paper).   
The third alternative drops time-separability, that is, the current period felicity 
function depends not just on current consumption, but also on past consumption.   
Habit formation is a portmanteau explanation for such specifications (e.g. Abel 
[2000]).  Finally, the expected utility hypothesis has been dropped in favour of 
alternatives, such as the Epstein-Zinn [1989, 1991] utility functions, that allow 
intertemporal substation and risk aversion to be modelled and estimated 
independently (see e.g. Hyde and Sherif [2002]).  An outsider trying to sum up the 
results of this literature can only conclude that it is difficult to argue that the 
intertemporal substitution elasticity is close to unity and virtually impossible to 
conclude that it is significantly above unity. 
As regards the interest elasticity of the demand for base money, most 
empirical studies do not favour the constant elasticity specification of the model.
31  
The popular log-linear specification implies a negative nominal interest rate elasticity 
whose absolute value starts at zero when the nominal interest rate is zero and 
                                                             
31 Few empirical studies use private consumption as the scale variable in the money demand function.  
Income (current or permanent) and financial wealth are more commonly found in that role.  32
increases without bound as the level of the nominal interest rate increases.  When the 
nominal interest rate is near the zero floor, the (absolute value of the) interest 
elasticity of money demand is therefore likely to be less than one, which would 
strengthen the positive impact on aggregate demand of a cut in the nominal rate of 
interest.  
The revaluation effect of a change in a real interest rate refers to the change in 
comprehensive wealth as some element in the sequence of current and future real 
interest rates changes (see equations (11), (12) and (20)).  We can further distinguish 
the financial wealth revaluation effect and the human wealth revaluation effect. 
The effect of a change in the period n real interest rate ( 1 nt ≥+ ) on human 



























The revaluation effect of a cut in the period n real interest rate (brought about 
in our example by a cut in the period n nominal interest rate holding constant the 
(anticipated) period n rate of inflation) is positive if after-tax labour income in period 
n and beyond is ‘on average’ positive.  
  As regards the financial wealth revaluation effect, the lower real interest rate 
associated with a lower nominal interest rate at a given inflation rate will also boost 
Tobin’s q, the market value of a unit of installed capital (see equation (21)).





≡ , both private consumption (equation (20)) and private investment 
                                                             
32 In equation (27), the government’s intertemporal budget constraint has not been substituted into the 
private sector comprehensive wealth definition.    33
(equation (23)) will be stimulated.  The revaluation effect of a lower interest rate 
boosts demand regardless of the value of the intertemporal substitution elasticity. 
The marginal propensity to consume multiplies the change in comprehensive 
wealth due to the valuation effect to get the effect on consumption.  The marginal 
propensity to consume out of comprehensive wealth is likely to be a rather small 
number, probably similar in magnitude to the long-run real rate of return on an 
annuity, say 0.045 at most (that is 4.5 percent per annum).
34  
A cut in short nominal interest rates may further boost private spending 
through a number of channels not considered in the formal model.  With imperfect 
financial markets (due, for instance, to asymmetric information and associated 
adverse selection and agency problems) there can be further effects on the cost and 
availability of funds to enterprises (or through the lending channel or the credit 
channel) and further effects on private investment.  Inventory investment, including 
investment in working capital (not formally modelled here) are further transmission 
mechanisms of changes in short nominal interest rates. 
 
3.2 Credible announcements of future cuts in nominal interest rates 
  The effect of a cut in current nominal interest rates can be leveraged through 
credible announcements of future cuts in interest rates.  Permanent income consumers 
will respond to such anticipated future cuts in interest rates through the same 
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34 Interpret the unit period to be one year.  The rate of pure time preference,  ρ  is, say, 0.03.  The death 
rate δ  is, say, 0.015.  In the Cobb-Douglas case, α  is the ratio (for permanent income households) of 
annual consumption to the sum of annual consumption and the value of the annual liquidity services 
yielded by money.  The monetary base in the UK in 2002 was about £36bn.  Household consumption 
(which includes the consumption of the Keynesian consumers who don’t hold money) was probably 
around £650 bn.  That sets a lower bound on α  of 0.945 approximately.  These numerical values 
imply  0.0412 µ ≈ .  34
substitution, income and revaluation channels (see equations (26) and (27) and 
footnote (28)).  In addition, both permanent income consumers and enterprises will 
raise spending through the effect of lower anticipated future interest rates on Tobin’s 
q (see footnote (33)). 
 
3.3 Devaluation 
  Instead of treating the short nominal interest rate as the monetary instrument, 
we can take the current nominal exchange rate to be the instrument.
35  It is easily 
checked that, for given sequences of current and expected future values of economy-
wide endogenous variables and exogenous variables, and for given values of current 
and future nominal interest rates  () , 1 ij j t ≥+ , a devaluation will increase the demand 
for domestic output if and only if it increases the trade balance surplus.  The trade 
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, holding constant the three domestic aggregate spending 
components, , c ι  and g  in terms of domestic output and holding constant 
* f , rest-of 
the world spending in terms of foreign output.  A depreciation of the real exchange 
rate, or (for given values of the domestic and foreign GDP deflators) a devaluation 
will increase the trade balance surplus from an initial position of balance if and only if 
sum of the export and import price elasticities of demand is greater than one - the 
familiar Marshall-Lerner conditions.   
                                                             
35 We should think of this devaluation as an unanticipated, immediate and permanent devaluation, if it 
is to be consistent with given sequences of domestic and foreign nominal interest rates and UIP.  35
Consider the case where the public spending and private investment are split 
among domestic output and imports in the same way as private consumption, that is, 
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In the Cobb-Douglas case, for instance, with 
* ˆ 1 θθθθ === = , the Marshall-
Lerner conditions are satisfied because the sum of the import and export price 
elasticities equals two. 
As defined here, the Marshall-Lerner conditions therefore do not necessarily 
capture the total effect of a devaluation on the trade balance or on aggregate demand.  
While  g  and 
* f  can for our purposes be taken to be exogenous, both aggregate 
private consumption, c, and aggregate private investment, ι , are endogenous and will 
in general depend on the exchange rate.   
Aggregate consumption will also be affected by a devaluation through a 
wealth effect.  From equation (20) it is clear that: 
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 Thus  if 
** B D + , the net stock of foreign-currency-denominated assets held by 
the domestic private sector and government, is positive (negative), devaluation will 
boost (lower) aggregate demand through a wealth effect.  
  Total private investment measured in domestic output, ι , will decline, other 
things being equal, when the exchange rate is devalued.  From equation (23) it is 
apparent that   36
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 (31) 
The reason is that a devaluation raises the price of the composite investment good,  I P  
relative to the price of installed capital, that is, it reduces Tobin’s q. 
A devaluation or sharp depreciation of the yen has been recommended as a 
cure for Japan’s deflationary ills by McKinnon and Ohno [1999] and Svensson 
[2000].  It is clear that devaluation is not guaranteed to work: the Marshall-Lerner 
conditions may not be satisfied; a country may be a net debtor in foreign currency-
denominated assets 
** () () 0 Bt Dt +< , and the effect of a real depreciation on 
aggregate investment is negative in our model.  On the other hand, if a devaluation 
boosts aggregate demand, it does so regardless of the level of nominal interest rates: 
devaluation can boost demand even when nominal interest rates are at their zero lower 
bound.   
Empirical evidence on the response of the trade balance to a devaluation 
appears to be supportive of the proposition that the Marshall-Lerner conditions are 
satisfied at least in the long run.  The short-run picture is mixed (see Goldstein and 
Khan [1985] and Rose [1991]).  This conclusion appears to have survived the co-
integration revolution (see e.g. Bahmani-Oskooee and Alse [1994]). 
 
3.4 Unconventional monetary policy when short nominal interest rates are zero. 
 
Without loss of generality, consider practically relevant case where the 
nominal interest rate on base money,  M i , is zero.  Assume the current short nominal 
interest rate i is at its zero lower bound.  Assume also that the authorities have 
credibly committed themselves to keep future short nominal interest rates at zero.   
What else can monetary policy do to stimulate aggregate demand?  37
 
3.4a. Generalised open market operations. 
Our formal model assumes that all non-monetary stores of value are perfect 
substitutes.  If this is not the case, even the credible announcement of a future policy 
of systematically keeping future short nominal interest rates at zero would not 
necessarily reduce the nominal yields on outstanding stocks of longer-maturity 
government securities to zero.  The could be term premia, liquidity premia and a 
variety of risk premia not recognised in models of efficient financial markets.  If such 
is the case, it is clear that monetary policy has not been exhausted.  Open market 
purchases of all government securities that have a positive nominal yield can be 
undertaken.  As long as there is a positive amount outstanding of any nominally 
denominated government security with a positive nominal yield, monetary policy has 
not yet run out of steam.   
The central bank can also expand the monetary base through purchases of 
foreign exchange reserves or indeed through purchases of foreign-issued and foreign-
currency-denominated securities of any maturity, including options and other 
derivatives.  It can also engage in purchases of foreign exchange reserves financed not 
by issuing additional base money but by reducing its holdings of general government 
securities.  There is little evidence to support the view that such ‘sterilised foreign 
exchange market intervention’ is an effective and reliable instrument for bringing 
down domestic interest rates, but even if it does not help, it is unlikely to hurt (unless 
markets begin to wonder why the central bank is engaging in pointless financial 
transactions).   
Even after monetising the entire public debt and purchasing large amounts of 
foreign securities, the central bank has options left.  It could turn its attention to the  38
domestic private sector by purchasing private domestic securities.  In times of 
financial stress and turbulence, central banks already have a well-established practice 
of easing the eligibility requirements for private securities that are acceptable as 
collateral in Repo operations.
36  The central bank can also expand the list of eligible 
counterparties that it is willing to deal with.  Beyond that, open market purchases of 
private bonds and other private financial instruments, including stocks and shares, 
options and other derivatives are, in principle possible.  Conceivably, the central bank 
could engage in ‘open market’ purchases of commercial, industrial or residential real 
estate.   
There are difficult issues involved in such transactions, including integrity 
problems, moral hazard, adverse selection and governance problems.  To make the 
(temporary) socialisation of private financial securities palatable, the central bank 
would have to buy something like a representative index fund of the eligible classes of 
securities, and refrain from interfering in the management of any enterprises it might 
acquire a significant ownership stake in. 
 
3.4b Spitting in the wind: introducing an inflation target or raising the target 
rate of inflation when the zero lower bound is binding everywhere 
 
Some authors (e.g. Krugman [1998d, 1999, 2000]) have proposed the credible 
announcement and immediate introduction of an inflation target as a means of 
escaping from the zero interest floor.  Assume the economy experiences deflation and 
that not only current short and long nominal rates of interest but also all anticipated 
future nominal interest rates are zero.  Under these circumstances, introducing an 
inflation target, or raising the inflation target rate, is spitting in the wind: it will not 
                                                             
36 The Bank of Japan now accepts a broader range of private debt as eligible collateral, and provides 
loans directly to private commercial banks at very low interest rates (see Bank of Japan [2003]).  39
affect the behaviour of the economy, as the target announcement has no implications 
for the current and future behaviour of the monetary policy instruments. 
Adopting a sufficiently high inflation target while one is not in the zero bound 
trap and pursuing it assiduously may well prevent one from ever getting into a 
generalised zero nominal interest rate trap and will in any case make such an 
eventuality less likely (King [.  Once you are in a generalized zero bound trap, 
announcing an inflation target without having any instruments, now or in the future, 
for achieving it is a pointless gesture (see Buiter and Panigirtzoglou [2001, 2003] for a 
formal demonstration of this intuitively obvious point).   
A number of Japanese monetary policy makers have argued against the 
aggressive use of monetisation of government debt as counter-deflationary policy on 
the grounds that this risked creating hyperinflation.  An inflation target and a credible 
commitment to use the available policy instruments to pursue but not to exceed that 
target could be useful if it allayed fears that the implementation of an effective anti-
deflationary policy would create excessive inflation (or even hyperinflation). 
 
3.4c Lowering the zero floor on nominal interest rates by imposing a carry tax on 
currency. 
 
  The reason we don’t see negative nominal interest rates on private securities 
and non-monetary government debt instruments is that the zero interest rate on base 
money sets a floor under all nominal interest rates.  If the authorities could pay 
negative interest on base money (effective impose a ‘carry tax’ on base money), the 
zero nominal interest rate floor would be lowered, and this constraint on the conduct 
of monetary policy would be removed.  Once the policy-determined nominal interest 
on base money ( M i  in our model) has been set below zero, other, market-determined  40
nominal yields on non-monetary public and private securities would follow, driven by 
the forces of arbitrage and competition. 
  Paying negative interest on commercial bank reserves held with the central 
bank is trivially simple.  Think of these reserves as akin to bank accounts held by the 
general public.  Households and enterprises get paid interest on the balance in these 
accounts and are charged for the cost of operating the accounts.  Commercial bank 
balances with the central bank (electronic ledger entries) are ‘registered securities’, in 
the terminology of Section 1 of this paper.  Paying any interest rate, negative or 
positive, can be done by electronically debiting or crediting the account.  It would be 
an administratively costless exercise. 
  Paying negative interest on currency, the bearer bond component of the base 
money stock, would be administratively cumbersome and costly.  There would have 
to be a sufficiently large and credible penalty for non-payment to induce the 
anonymous holders of currency to come forward, receive their negative interest (pay 
their tax) and have their currency notes marked as ‘current’ in a way that cannot be 
forged easily and is recognisable by all.  Resort to a carry tax on currency would be 
justified if the cost of the alternative (either living with a binding zero floor or the best 
alternative policy for escaping from the zero nominal interest rate floor trap) were 
higher.  We shall see in Section 4 that there is at least one alternative policy that 
always will boost aggregate demand, and does not involve significant implementation 
costs. 
  
4. Fiscal Policies To Stimulate Aggregate Demand 
If the deflationary problem has not been solved by any of the monetary 
measures considered in Section 3, the state still is not powerless.  Fiscal or mixed  41
monetary and fiscal policy options remain and one of these, the ‘helicopter drop of 
money’ of Friedman fame, will always be able to boost nominal aggregate demand.  
To focus the argument, I will in what follows assume that  0 M i = , that is, the nominal 
interest rate on base money is zero, and that  ( ) 0, 1 ij j t =≥ + , that is, all current and 
future short nominal interest rates are also zero.  In the formal model, monetary policy 
has become incapable of boosting nominal aggregate demand.  
 
4.1 Debt-financed tax cuts. 
It is clear from equation (20), that a debt-financed tax cut in period t will 
stimulate aggregate private consumption demand in period t through two channels: 
increased spending by Keynesian consumers whose current disposable income has 
increased and increased spending by permanent income consumers for whom 
postponing taxes through borrowing raises the present discounted value of lifetime 
taxes.  Permanent income consumers raise their consumption because part of the 
postponed taxes will be paid by new households who are not yet born at the time of 
the tax cut, and who therefore will not reduce their consumption.   
Consider the effect of a tax cut in period t accompanied by the credible 
announcement of an increase in taxes in period t+1 of equal present value, that is, 
(1 ) [ 1(1 ) ]( )0 dt r t dt ττ += − + + > .  The effect of the period t tax cut on the Keynesian 
consumers is given by 














.  The future tax increase does 
not affect the current spending behaviour of the Keynesian consumers.  
Forward-looking permanent income consumers change their period t 
consumption by  (1 ) ( ) dt λµτ −−  in response to the period t tax cut, and their period t 
























 in response to the  42
anticipated increase in taxes in period t+1.  The net effect of this postponement of 
taxes financed by borrowing is  
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 (32)
37 
Only part of the boost to aggregate consumption demand will fall on consumption 
demand for domestic output (see equation (3)). 
If there are no Keynesian consumers,  0 λ = , there still is a positive effect on 
consumer demand of a debt-financed tax cut that satisfies the government’s 
intertemporal budget constraint.  In that case: 
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 (33) 
Only if the birth rate is zero ( 0 β = ) and we are effectively in a representative 
agent model, will there be debt neutrality or Ricardian equivalence: debt-financed tax 
cuts will not stimulate aggregate demand: 
 


















4.2 A tax- or debt-financed temporary increase in public spending on goods and 
services. 
 
  Without Keynesian consumers and with a zero birth rate, temporary increases 
in public spending will still stimulate aggregate demand.  Consider a one-period 
increase in government spending on goods and services in period t.  The public 
spending increase directly raises aggregate demand one-for-one.  Aggregate demand 
for domestic output increases by the increase in public spending increase times the 
marginal share of public spending on domestic output in total public spending (see  43
equation (19).  Aggregate private consumption by permanent income consumers will 
be reduced less than one-for-one, even if the period t public spending increase is 
financed with a balanced budget (by raising taxes in line with public spending in 
period t).  The impact of any tax increase on consumption by a permanent income 
household is spread out over its remaining lifetime.  When  0 λβ ==  (and, for 
simplicity also  1 ϕ σ == ), we have:  
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Since  01 µ << , a temporary increase in public spending financed ultimately 
or immediately by tax increases, will boost aggregate demand.  A permanent increase 
in public spending would have associated with it an increase in the present discounted 
value of future taxes whose negative effect on current private consumption would be 
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In an open economy, a permanent, tax-financed public spending increase can 
boost demand for domestic output even if it does not boost aggregate demand for the 
composite commodity.  This will be the case if at the margin government spending is 
more concentrated on domestically produced goods than private spending, that is, if 
ˆ η η > . 
                                                                                                                                                                          
37 We know that the tax cut is debt financed, because, from equations (18) and (20), if either public 
spending were cut or base money were issued to finance the tax cut, there would be additional effects 
to be considered. 
38In the double logarithmic case, 
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Only if public consumption were a private substitute for private consumption 
would a temporary, tax financed increase in public spending could fail to boost 
aggregate demand in a world with just permanent income consumers.  The formal 
model assumed that any utility households may derive from public spending is 
separable from that of private consumption, so such ‘direct crowding out’ does not 
occur.  
 
4.3 The one that always works: Friedman’s helicopter drop of money. 
  Finally, there is the monetary-fiscal policy combination that always succeeds 
in stimulating aggregate demand: the tax cut or transfer payment financed by issuing 
base money.  We reproduce the consumption function of equation (20) as equation 
(37), making all the assumptions necessary to emasculate monetary and fiscal policy 
to the maximum extent:  () () 0 , 1 M iji j j t ==≥ +  (all nominal interest rates are at 
their zero lower bound),  0 λ =  (there are no Keynesian consumers) and  0 β =  (there 
is debt neutrality).  
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The effect of a tax cut in, say, period t , financed through an increase in the 




















This effect can be enhanced by announcing a sequence of current and future 
tax cuts, all financed by increasing the future stock of base money.  The timing of the 
tax cuts and timing of their monetisation does not matter; as long as the future tax cuts 
are credible, only their present value matters for private consumption. 
What we are describing here is, of course, Milton Friedman’s ‘helicopter drop 
of money’.
40  The lump-sum gift or transfer payment from the state (equivalent to a 
lump-sum tax cut for households) is financed by printing money (and dropping it from 
a great height).  There are no future tax liabilities implied by this transfer payment, 
because it is financed through the issuance of zero nominal interest-bearing base 
money.  Even if there are no Keynesian consumers, such money-financed tax cuts or 
transfer payments will boost aggregate demand.  In the current Japanese context this 
would be called a combination of tax cuts and ‘quantitative monetary easing’. 
The proposition that money-financed tax cuts or transfer payments always 
boost consumption demand is not contingent on the details of the specification of the 
objective function of households.  All that is required is that aggregate consumption in 
any given period is a normal good.  As long as this holds, an increase in household 
resources (and a-fortiori an increase in household resources that takes the form of an 
perfectly liquid increase in current disposable income) will boost aggregate demand.   
The effect of a public spending increase in period t , financed through an 
increase in the nominal money stock in, say, period t, (or equivalently, though any 
                                                             
39 We know that increase in the base money stock finances a tax cut because we are holding the 
sequence of public spending constant.  From equations (18) and (20) (or (37)), the counterpart to the 
base money increase can only be a tax cut.  
40 Technically, Friedman’s helicopter drop of money represents a capital transfer rather than a one-off 
tax cut or current transfer payment.  Behaviourally, the distinction between capital and current transfers 
is irrelevant.  46
sequence of current and future money issues equal in present discounted value to the 


















  This means that aggregate demand (for domestic and foreign goods) increases 
by the same amount as the increase in public spending, when the increase in public 
spending is financed by printing money. 
 
4.4 Feldstein’s proposal: using indirect tax changes to tilt the intertemporal 
terms of trade in favour of current consumption 
 
During the past few years, Martin Feldstein has made proposals for tax policy 
measures to counteract deflation in Japan that do not in the first instance work through 
the income or wealth effects of tax cuts (see Feldstein [2002a, b]).  Feldstein relies on 
the strength of the intertemporal substitution effect in household consumption 
behaviour.  He proposes an immediate cut in value added tax (VAT) rates 
accompanied by the credible announcement of a future VAT rate increase above its 
current level.  This combination early tax rate cut and later tax rate increase could be 
made revenue-neutral in present value terms.  The effect of such a tax package would 
be to reduce the real interest rate ‘at market prices’ relevant to household consumption 
decisions.  This real interest rate ‘at market prices’, denoted r
%
, involves the 
comparison of market price indices at two dates.  Market prices are the sum of prices 
at factor cost plus indirect taxes.  More precisely, letting P denote the GDP deflator at 
factor cost, r the real interest rate ‘at factor cost’ and θ  the VAT tax rate, we have 
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41 We know that increase in the base money stock finances a tax cut because we are holding the 
sequence of public spending constant.  From equations (18) and (20) (or (37)), the counterpart to the 
base money increase can only be a tax cut.   47
 
  At any given real interest rate at factor cost, a lower VAT rate today and/or a 
higher VAT rate tomorrow reduce the current real interest rate.  It becomes cheaper to 
consume today and more expensive to consume tomorrow.  If we interpret Feldstein’s 
proposal as revenue-neutral in present value terms, the income effect of the tax rate 
changes is approximately zero, and the effect on current consumption will reflect 
solely the substitution effect of a cut in the current real interest rate (at market prices) 
faced by consumers.  This will boost consumption. 
  There is a long history of temporary tax and subsidy measures of this kind that 
were targeted at enterprise investment decisions rather than at household 
consumption.  For instance, a temporary investment tax credit or a temporary 
investment subsidy will bring investment forward to take advantage of the shift in the 
intertemporal terms of trade in favour of earlier rather than later investment.   
Measures targeted at the enterprise investment decisions are generally thought to have 
been reasonably effective.   
 
5. Institutional Arrangements To Tackle Deflation: How Much Can 
The Central Bank Do On Its Own? 
 
  To evaluate implementation issues, we break down the consolidated budget 
constraint and solvency constraint of the general government and central bank into 
separate accounts each for the general government and the central bank. 
The central bank has the monetary base (M , currency plus commercial bank 
reserves with the central bank) on the liability side of its balance sheet.
42  On the asset 
side it has the stock of international foreign exchange reserves (
* D ) and the stock of 
domestic credit.  For simplicity, in what follows domestic credit is restricted to central  48
bank credit to the general government, that is, central bank holdings of nominally 
denominated general government interest-bearing debt (
CB B ).
43  
  Equation (41) is the budget identity of the general government and equation 
(42) that of the central bank.
44  N o t e  t h a t  B is the stock of general government 
interest-bearing debt held outside the central bank, that 
P τ  is real value of the tax 
payments by the domestic private sector to the general government, 
CB τ  the real value 
of taxes paid by the central bank to the general government and h the real value of the 
transfer payments made by the central bank to the private sector (‘helicopter drops’ if 
they are monetised). 
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 (42) 
  The usual solvency constraints, ruling out Ponzi finance by both the 
government and the central bank, imply the following intertemporal budget 
constraints for the general government (equation (43)) and for the central bank 
(equation (44)). 
                                                                                                                                                                          
42 For simplicity, all of the monetary base is treated as non-interest bearing ( 0 M i = ). 
43 In many transition countries and developing countries the central bank also holds significant amounts 
of private sector debt instruments among its assets and interest-bearing, non-monetary liabilities among 
its liabilities. 
44 Note that the familiar proposition that the change in the monetary base equals domestic credit 
expansion plus the value of the change in the stock of foreign exchange reserves is correct if and only if 
the central bank makes no after-tax profits, that is, its before-tax profits, 
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Summing (41) and (42) and noting that 
P h ττ ≡−  gives the budget identity of 
the state, that is, of the consolidated general government and central bank, in equation 
(17) and the intertemporal budget constraint of the state in equation (18).  
Consider the balance sheet of the central bank in Table 2 
Table 2 
Central Bank Balance Sheet 
Assets Liabilities 
CB B  
* SD  
M  
  CB N  
 
  The central bank’s financial net worth, 
CB N , is the excess of its financial 
assets, general government debt, 
CB B , and foreign exchange reserves, 
* D , over its 
monetary liabilities, M .  Note that, in principle, there is nothing to prevent 
CB N  from 
being negative.  Financial net worth excludes the present value of anticipated or 
planned future non-contractual outlays and revenues.  It is therefore perfectly 
possible, in principle, for the central bank to survive and thrive with a negative 
financial net worth.    50
  From the central bank’s balance sheet in Table 2 and its budget identity in (42)
, it follows that  
 
* CB CB NB S D M ≡+−  (45) 
The central bank’s intertemporal budget constraint given in (44) can therefore also be 
written as (46).   
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  The value of the central bank’s financial net worth has to be sufficient to pay 
(in present discounted value) for future transfers to the Treasury and to the private 
sector, allowing for the fact that future interest savings permitted by the issuance of 
non-interest-bearing base money are another source of revenue that the central bank 
can draw upon. 
 
5.1 What kind of open market operations can the Central Bank engage in on its 
own? 
 
  While most central banks can buy and sell most general government securities 
and are permitted to buy or sell foreign exchange reserves, many central banks are not 
permitted to buy and sell private financial sector instruments such as corporate bonds 
or stocks, shares and real estate (other than their own offices).  Whenever the central 
bank is not permitted to buy a particular financial instrument (private or public, 
domestic or foreign), the economically equivalent outcome can be achieved by the 
general government (typically the Treasury or the Ministry of Finance) buying that 
financial instrument and borrowing from the central bank to finance that purchase.  
The central bank then monetises the transaction.    51
  In the Euro area, the ECB and the other members of the European System of 
Central Banks are not permitted to extend credit directly to the general government 
sector or to purchase general government securities directly, in the primary issue 
market.  However, the economically equivalent result can always be achieved by the 
general government selling its debt instruments to the market and the central bank 
purchasing the same amount of general government debt in the secondary market. 
  Equations (44) or (46) allow us to give precise expression to a concern 
expressed by the Bank of Japan when confronted with proposals that it purchase 
private sector debt instruments, equity or other nominal or real assets.  If these assets 
were to be bought at a price in excess of their fundamental values (or if, despite 
having been bought at a fair price, unexpected subsequent developments were to 
depress the value of these assets), the central bank can maintain its solvency only by 
building up its holdings of earning assets (
CB B  or 
* D ) either through the issuance of 




, or through transfers by the general government, 
CB τ − , 
that is, by being recapitalised by the general government. 
  What is surprising is that, even under deflationary conditions, senior members 
of the Bank of Japan Policy Board worry about possible inflationary consequences of 
additional monetary issuance.  In this case (and up to a point), higher inflation (a 
lower rate of deflation) is not a problem but part of the solution (see e.g. Bank of 
Japan [2002] and Kirchner [2002]).  
 
5.2 Can the central bank perform a ‘helicopter money drop’ on its own? 
  Technically, if the central bank could make transfer payments to the private 
sector, the entire Friedmanian helicopter money drop could be implemented by the 
central bank.  At time t there would be a large increase in  ( ) Ht financed by  52
increasing the monetary base (‘printing money’).  A vivid example would be for the 
Governor of the central bank to issue a $1,000 cheque (or its local currency 
equivalent), drawn upon the central bank’s account, to every man, woman and child in 
the country.  On the balance sheet of the central bank this would show up as an 
increase in the stock of base money and a corresponding reduction in the financial net 
worth of the central bank.  In its budget constraint there would be a transfer payment 
to the private sector finance through base money issuance.   
The legality of such an implementation of the helicopter drop of money by the 
central bank alone would be dubious in most countries with clearly drawn boundaries 
between the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance or the Treasury.  The Central 
Bank would be undertaking an overtly fiscal action, which is normally the exclusive 
province of the Treasury or the Ministry of Finance.  An economically equivalent 
implementation of the helicopter drop of money would be a tax cut (or a transfer 
payment) implemented by the general government, financed through the sale of 
government debt to the Central Bank, with the Central Bank then monetising that debt 
increase.  If the direct sale of general government debt to the Central Bank (or Central 
Bank lending to the general government) is prohibited (as it is for the countries that 
belong to the Euro area), the monetisation of the government tax cut could be 
accomplished by the general government financing the tax through the sale of 
interest-bearing debt to the domestic private sector or overseas, with the Central Bank 
purchasing that same amount of interest-bearing debt in the secondary markets.  If a 
$1,000 cheque does not do an adequate job of boosting demand, the number of zeros 




Preventing or combating deflation poses some unique difficulties for the 
monetary authorities - difficulties that are not present in preventing or combating 
inflation.  Nevertheless, deflation can always be prevented and, if it has taken hold, 
can always be overcome by co-ordinated actions of the monetary and fiscal 
authorities.   
Monetary policy alone cannot always prevent or cure deflation, if we restrict 
ourselves to conventional monetary policy, that is, reductions in the risk-free short 
nominal interest rate or a devaluation of the nominal exchange rate.  Monetary policy 
alone is likely to prevent or cure deflation if the monetary authority is willing and able 
to monetise (if necessary without limit) the outstanding stock of public debt (short, 
long, nominal or index-linked), and/or perform open market purchases of a wide 
range of foreign and private domestic securities.  If the monetary authorities are 
willing and able to contemplate an even more unconventional monetary instrument - 
the payment of negative nominal interest rates on base money through the imposition 
of a carry tax on currency - the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates disappears 
as a constraint on monetary policy.   
To say that deflation can be prevented or cured using conventional monetary 
and fiscal policy is not to say that all economic problems faced by the most prominent 
current example of a deflation-afflicted economy - Japan - can be solved using 
conventional monetary and fiscal policy.  The Japanese banking sector is paralysed by 
a massive overhang of bad debt.  Other financial intermediaries, especially insurance 
companies, are suffering the cumulative impact on their balance sheets of the most 
spectacular asset boom and collapse in modern history – the stock market and real 
estate boom of the 1980s and its unravelling since 1989 (see Figure 1).    54
Cleaning up the balance sheet of the Japanese banking sector, reducing the 
size of the banking sector and recapitalising key viable non-bank intermediaries will 
be a painful and protracted process.  In the non-financial economy it will manifest 
itself as increased redundancies, idle capacity, bankruptcies and business failures.  It 
does not seem plausible, however, that this inevitably painful structural adjustment 
would be facilitated by persisting with the deflationary demand management policies 
of the last few years. 
Deflation is problem that can be avoided.  If it has taken hold, it is a problem 
that can be solved.  A tax cut (or transfer payment) directly aimed at households and 
financed by increasing the stock of base money will surely boost aggregate demand.  
So will a base-money-financed increase in public spending.   
Achieving a sustained reduction in inflation is likely to require tax increases or 
public spending cuts.  It therefore tends to be politically unpopular.  Anti-deflationary 
policies involve tax cuts, increased transfer payment or increased public spending.  
They will tend to be politically popular.  It is therefore somewhat of a mystery why a 
policy programme that makes economic sense and should be politically popular does 
not get implemented.  The clue to solution of this mystery probably lies in the fact 
that, with conventional monetary policy nearly exhausted, further effective anti-
deflationary policy requires the co-operation of the central bank and the Ministry of 
Finance in the design and implementation of a co-ordinated monetary-fiscal stimulus. 
Some of the central banks that acquired operational independence only 
recently have interpreted central bank independence to means the absence of co-
operation, co-ordination and at times even communication with the fiscal authorities.   55
Mutual distrust between operationally independent monetary and fiscal authorities is 
probably the root cause of a persistent failure to address a deflation problem.  
Milton Friedman argued that inflation (and by implication deflation) is always 
and everywhere a monetary phenomenon – and he was right.
45  Sargent and Wallace 
[1981] showed that, in the long-run, because of the government’s intertemporal 
budget constraint which limits the government’s capacity to borrow, money (and 
therefore inflation and deflation) is always and everywhere a fiscal phenomenon – and 
they too were right.  Structuralists, and political economists inform us that excessive 
public sector deficits are the result of unresolved social and political conflict about the 
size and composition of state spending and about who should pay for it.  They too 
may well be right.  I would like to add to this sequence of truths the proposition that 
persistent unwanted deflation is always and everywhere evidence of unnecessary, 
avoidable macroeconomic mismanagement.  Governments through the ages have 
demonstrated an uncanny ability to create inflation, often to undesirable and at times 
disastrous levels.  It is hard to believe that the very simple analytics and attractive 
politics of making inflation have been forgotten in the new Millennium.  
 
                                                             
45 It follows from the propositions I have so far stated that inflation is always and everywhere a 
monetary phenomenon in the sense that it is and can be produced only by a more rapid increase in the 
quantity of money than in output. However, the reason for the rapid increase in the quantity of money 
may be very different under different circumstances. It has sometimes reflected gold discoveries, 
sometimes changes in banking systems, sometimes the financing of private spending, sometimes—
perhaps most of the time—the financing of governmental spending. (Friedman [1973])  56
References 
 
Abel, A.B. [1990], “Asset prices under habit formation and catching up with the 
Joneses”, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 80, pp. 38-42. 
 
Ahearne, Alan, Joseph Gagnon, Jane Haltmaier, Steve Kamin and Christopher Erceg, 
Jon Faust, Luca Guerrieri, Carter Hemphill, Linda Kole, Jennifer Roush, John Rogers, 
Nathan Sheets and Jonathan Wrigth [1001], “Preventing Deflation: Lessons from 
Japan’s Experience in the 1990’s”, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, International Finance Discussion Paper No. 729, June. 
 
Akerlof, G.A. W.T. Dickens and W. L. Perry [1996], “The macroeconomics of low 
inflation”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1. 
 
Bahmani-Oskooee, M., and J. Alse [1994], “Short-Run Versus Long-Run Effects of 
Devaluation: Error-Correction Modelling and Cointegration,” Eastern Economic 
Journal, 20, 4, pp. 453-64. 
 
Bailey, Martin J. [1956], “The Welfare Costs of Inflationary Finance,” Journal of 
Political Economy, vol. 64, no. 2, April, pp. 93–110. 
 
Bank of Japan [2002], “How Should the Recent Increase in Japan’s Monetary Base 
Be Understood?”, Issue Papers on Monetary Policy, Policy Planning Office, 
September 5. 
 
Bank of Japan [2003], “Minutes of the Monetary Policy Meeting on January 21 and 
22, 2003, February 19, http://www.boj.or.jp/en/seisaku/03/pb/g030122_f.htm. 
 
Basu, Susanto and Miles S. Kimball [2000], “ Long-Run Labor Supply and the 
Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution for Consumption”, University of Michigan 
mimeo, December. 
 
Benhabib, Jess, Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé and Martín Uribe [2001], “The Perils of 
Taylor Rules”, Journal of Economic Theory, 96, January/February 2001, 40-69.  
 
Benhabib, Jess, Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé and Martín Uribe [2002], “Avoiding 
Liquidity Traps”, Journal of Political Economy, 110, June 2002, 535-563.  
 
Bernanke, Ben S. [1983], "Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in 
Propagation of the Great Depression." American Economic Review 73, June, pp. 257-
76. 
 
Bernanke, Ben S. [2002], “Deflation: Making Sure “It” Doesn’t Happen Here.”   
Remarks before the National Economists Club, Washington D.C., November 21. 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/BoardDocs/speeches/2002/20021121/default.htm 
 
Bernanke, Ben S. and Mark Gertler [1995], “Inside the Black Box: The Credit 
Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9, 
Fall, pp. 27-48. 
  57
Bewley, T.F. [1999], Why Wages Don’t Fall During a Recession, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge MA. 
 
Blanchard, Olivier [1985], “Debt, Deficits and Finite Horizons”, Journal of Political 
Economy, VOL. 93, PP. 223-47. 
 
Blinder, A.S. [1995], “On sticky prices: academic theories meet the real world”, in 
Monetary Policy, Studies in Business Cycles, Vol. 28, N.G. Mankiw ed., University of 
Chicago Press. 
 
Boskin, Michael J., E. Dulberger, R. Gordon, Z. Griliches and D. Jorgenson [1996], 
"Toward a More Accurate Measure of the Cost of Living: Final Report to the Senate 
Finance Committee,", Washington, DC, U.S. Government Printing Office, for the 
U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, December. 
 
Boskin, Michael J., E. Dulberger, R. Gordon, Z. Griliches, and D. Jorgenson [1997], 
"Consumer Prices, the Consumer Price Index and the Cost of Living," Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, Fall 1997.  
 
Bryant, Ralph C. [2000], “Comment on: Overcoming the Zero Bound on Interest Rate 
Policy”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol 32, No. 2, Pt. 2, November, pp. 
1036-1050. 
 
Buiter, Willem H. [1988], “Death, Birth, Productivity Growth and Debt Neutrality”, 
Economic Journal, June, pp. 279-293. 
 
Buiter, Willem H. [1990], “Debt Neutrality, Redistribution and Consumer 
Heterogeneity: A Survey and Some Extensions”, in Macroeconomics, Finance and 
Economic Policy; Essays in Honor of James Tobin, W. Brainard, W. Nordhaus and H. 
Watts, eds. MIT Press, Cambridge MA. 1991.  Also in Willem H. Buiter Principles of 
Budgetary and Financial Policy, MIT Press, pp. 183-222. 
 
Buiter, Willem H. [2003], Appendix to Deflation: Prevention and Cure, European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development mimeo, http://www.nber.org/~wbuiter/defap  
 
Buiter, Willem H. and Nikolaos Panigirtzoglou [2001], “Liquidity Traps: How to 
Avoid Them and How to Escape Them”, in Wim F.V. Vanthoor and Joke Mooi, 
Reflections on Economics and Econometrics, Essays in Honour of Martin M. G. Fase, 
2001, De Nederlandsche Bank, pp. 13-58. 
 
Buiter, Willem H. and Nikolaos Panigirtzoglou [2003], "Overcoming the Zero Bound 
on Nominal Interest Rates with Negative Interest on Currency: Gesell’s Solution", 
forthcoming Economic Journal, 2003. 
 
Card, David and D. Hyslop [1997], “Does inflation grease the wheels of the labor 
market”, in C.D. Romer and D. Romer (eds,) Reducing Inflation, NBER Studies in 
Business Cycles, Vol. 30, University of Chicago Press. 
  58
Clouse, James, Dale Henderson, Athanasios Orphanides, David Small and Peter 
Tinsley [1999], “Monetary Policy When the Nominal Short-Term Interest Rate is 
Zero”, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Mimeo, July 13. 
 
Cristiano, L. J [2000], “Comments on McCallum, “Theoretical Analysis Regarding a 
Zero Lower Bound on Nominal Interest Rates””, Journal of Money, Credit and 
Banking, 32, pp. 905-930. 
 
Epstein, Larry G. and Stanley E. Zin [1989], “Substitution, Risk Aversion, and the 
Temporal Behavior of Consumption and Asset Returns: A Theoretical Framework,” 
Econometrica, Vol. 57, No. 4., pp. 937-969. 
 
Epstein, Larry G. and Stanley E. Zin [1991], “Substitution, Risk Aversion, and the 
Temporal Behavior of Consumption and Asset Returns: An Empirical Analysis, 
Journal of Political Economy, , 99 (2), April, pp. 263-286. 
 
Feldstein, Martin [2002a], “Deflation”,  remarks made at the BIS Central Bankers 
dinner in Mexico City on November 11, 2002, mimeo. 
 
Feldstein, Martin [2002b],“The Role for Discretionary Fiscal Policy in a Low Interest 
Rate Environment,” NBER Working Paper 9203 (www.nber.org/papers/w9203), 
forthcoming in the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City annual Jackson Hole 
conference volume for 2002.   
 
Fischer, Stanley [1979a], “"Anticipations and the Non-Neutrality of Money," Journal 
of Political Economy, April, 225-52.  
 
Fischer, Stanley [1979b], "Capital Accumulation on the Transition Path in a Monetary 
Optimizing Model," Econometrica, November, 1433-40.   
 
Fisher, I., [1932]. Booms and Depressions, New York: Adelphi Company. 
 
Fisher, Irving [1933a], “The Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions”, 
Econometrica, March, pp. 337-57. 
 
Fisher, Irving [1933b], Stamp Scrip, Adelphi Company, New York. 
 
Freedman, Charles [2000], “Comment on: Overcoming the Zero Bound on Interest 
Rate Policy”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol 32, No. 2, Pt. 2, November, 
pp. 1051-1057. 
 
Friedman, Milton [1969], “The Optimum Quantity of Money,”  in  The Optimum 
Quantity of Money and Other Essays, Chicago: Aldine, 1969, pp.1–50. 
 
Friedman, Milton [1973], Money and Economic Development; the Horowitz Lectures 
of 1972.  Praeger, New York. 
 
Fuhrer, J. C. and B. F. Madigan [1997], “Monetary Policy when Interest Rates are 
Bounded at Zero,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 79, pp. 573-585. 
  59
Gesell, Silvio [1949], Die Natuerliche Wirtschaftsordnung, Rudolf Zitzman Verlag, 
available in English as The Natural Economic Order, Peter Owen Ltd, London, 1958. 
 
Goldstein, M. and M.S. Khan [1985], Income and Price Effects in Foreign Trade, in 
R.W. Jones and P.B. Kenen, eds., Handbook of International Economics, Vol. II, 
1040-1105. 
 
Goodfriend, Marvin [2000], “Overcoming the Zero Bound on Interest Rate Policy”, 
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 32, No. 4, Pt. 2, November, pp. 1007-
1035. 
 
Guvenen, Fatih [2003], “Reconciling Conflicting Evidence on the Elasticity of 
Intertemporal Substitution: A Macroeconomic Perspective”, University of Rochester 
Mimeo, January. 
 
Haberler, Gottfried von [1937], Prosperity and Depression. A Theoretical Analysis of 
Cyclical Movements, Geneva: League of Nations, revised and enlarged editions, 1939, 
1941, 1958. 
 
Hall, Robert E. [1988], “Intertemporal Substitution in Consumption,” Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol. 96, No.2, pp. 339-357. 
 
Hansen, Lars P., and Kenneth J. Singleton [1983], “Stochastic Consumption, Risk 
Aversion, and the Temporal Behavior of Asset Returns,” Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol 91, No.2, pp. 249-265. 
 
Hayami, Masaru [2002], Toward Revitalization of Japan's Economy, Speech given at 
the Keizai (Economic) Club, on January 29, 2002. 
 
Hondroyiannis, George, P.A.V.B. Swamy and George S. Tavlas [2000], “Is the 
Japanese Economy in a Liquidity Trap?”, Economics Letters, 66, pp. 17-23. 
 
Hyde, Stuart and Mohamed Sherif [2002], “Risk Aversion versus Intertemporal 
Substitution: Consumption Models in the UK”, Manchester School of Accounting and 
Finance, mimeo, September. 
 
Issing, Otmar [2002], “The Euro After Four Years: Is there a Risk of Deflation” , 
paper presented at the 16th European Finance Convention, 2 December 2002, 
London.  
 
Ito, Takatoshi [1998], “Japan and the Asian Financial Crisis: The Role of Financial 
Supervision in Restoring Growth”; paper presented at a conference on “The Japanese 
Financial System”, New York: Columbia University, October. 
 
Itoh, Motoshige and Naoki Shimoi [2000], “On the Role of Monetary Policy in a 
Deflationary Economy: the Case of Japan”, Journal of the Japanese and International 
Economies, Vol. 14, No. 4, December, pp. 238-260. 
 
Iwata, Shigeru and Shu Wu [2001], “Estimating Monetary Policy Effects When 
Interest Rates are Bounded at Zero”, Department of Economics, University of Kansas 
mimeo, May.   60
 
Johnson, Karen, David Small and Ralph Tryon [1999], “Monetary Policy and Price 
Stability”, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, International Finance 
Discussion Papers, No 641, July. 
 
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking [2000], Monetary Policy in a Low-Inflation 
Environment, 32, No 4, Part 2, November. 
 
Kahneman, D. , J. Knetch and T. Thaler [1986], “Fairness as a constraint on profit 
seeking: entitlements in the market”, American Economic Review, Vol. 76, No. 4. 
 
Keynes, John Maynard [1931], “The Consequences to the Banks of the Collapse of 
Money Value”, in J.M. Keynes, Essays in Persuasion, London, MacMillan. 
 
Keynes, John Maynard [1936], The General Theory of Interest, Money and 
Employment, Macmillan, London. 
 
King, Mervyn [1994], “Debt Deflation: Theory and Evidence.”, European Economic 
Review, 38, pp. 419-445. 
  
King, Mervyn [2002], “The inflation target ten years on”, Bank of England Quarterly 
Bulletin, Vol. 42, No. 4, Winter, pp.459-474. 
 
Kirchner, Stephen [2002], “Japan, Deflation and the BoJ: An Institutional Perspective 
on Japanese Monetary Policy”, Paper prepared for the 31st Conference of Economists 
Adelaide, Australia 30 September – 3 October 2002, mimeo School of Economics, 
Faculty of Commerce, University of New South Wales. 
 
Krugman, Paul [1998a], "Japan's trap", mimeo, May. 
 
Krugman, Paul [1998b] "Further notes on Japan's liquidity trap", mimeo, June  
 
Krugman, Paul [1998c] "Japan: still trapped", mimeo, November.  
 
Krugman, Paul [1998d], "It's baaack! Japan's slump and the return of the liquidity 
trap", Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2, pp. 137-205. 
 
Krugman, Paul [1999], "Inflation targeting in a liquidity trap: the law of the excluded 
middle", mimeo February 1999  
 
Krugman, Paul [2000], “Thinking About the Liquidity Trap”, Journal of the Japanese 
and International Economies, Vol. 14, No.4, December 2000, pp. 221-237. 
 
McCallum, Bennett T. [2000], “Theoretical Analysis Regarding a Zero Lower Bound 
on Nominal Interest Rates”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 32, No 4, Pt. 2, 
pp. 870-904. 
 
McCallum, Bennett T. [2002], “Inflation Targeting and the Liquidity Trap”,  in 
Norman Loyaza and Raimundo Soto eds., Inflation Targeting: Design, Performance, 
Challenges, Santiago, Central Bank of Chile, pp. 395-437.  61
 
McKinnon, Ronald and Kenichi Ohno [1999], “The Foreign Exchange Origins of 
Japan’s Economic Slump in the 1990s: The Interest Rate Trap”, Mimeo, Bank of 
England, March. 
 
McLaughlin K. J. [1994], “Rigid Wages”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 34(3), pp. 
384-414. 
 
Meltzer, Allan H. [1999],”The Transmission Process”, mimeo, March 
 
Meltzer, Allan H. [2001], “Monetary Transmission at Low Inflation: Some Clues 
from Japan in the 1990s”, in Monetary and Economic Studies (Special Edition), 
February, pp. 13-34. 
 
Minsky, Hyman [1975], John Maynard Keynes, Columbia University Press. 
 
Minsky, Hyman [1986], Stabilizing an Unstable Economy, Yale University Press. 
 
Miyal, Ryuzo [2000], “The Role of Monetary Policy in Japan: A Break in the 
1990s?”,  Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Vol. 14, No. 4, 
December, pp. 366-384. 
 
Mulligan, Casey B. [2002], “Capital, Interest, and Aggregate Intertemporal 
Substitution During the 20th Century”, University of Chicago Department of 
Economics Mimeo, August.  
 
Nickell, S. and G. Quintini [2003], “Nominal wage rigidity and the rate of inflation”, 
Discussion Paper No. 489, Centre for Economic Performance, London School of 
Economics, September 2001, revised November 2002, forthcoming Economic 
Journal. 
 
Nishizaki, Kenj and Tsutomu Watanabe [2002], “Output-Inflation Trade-Off and 
Near-Zero Inflation Rates”, Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, 
Vol. 14, No. 4, December, pp. 304-326. 
 
OECD [2002], Economic Outlook, Vol. 2002/2, No. 72, December. 
 
Orphanides, Athanasios and Volker Wieland [1998], “Price Stability and Monetary 
Policy Effectiveness when Nominal Interest Rates are Bounded at Zero”, Finance and 
Economics Discussion Series, Federal Reserve Board, Divisions of Research and 
Statistics and Monetary Affairs.   
 
Orphanides, Athanasios and Volker Wieland [2000], “Efficient Monetary Policy 
Design near Price Stability”, Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, 
Vol. 14, No. 4, December, pp. 327-365. 
 
Porter, William [1999], “Negative Rates – An Exploration”, Credit Suisse First 
Boston Market Analysis, 25 May. 
  62
Rose, A.K. [1991], “The Role of Exchange Rates in a Popular Model of International 
Trade: Does the ‘Marshall-Lerner Condition Hold?”, Journal of International 
Economics, 30, pp. 301-316. 
 
Sargent, Thomas J. and Neil Wallace [1981], “Some Unpleasant Monetarist 
Arithmetic”, Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Fall. 
 
Sidrauski, M. [1967], “Inflation and Economic Growth”, Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. 75, No. 4, December, pp. 796-810. 
 
Smith, J.C. [2000], “Nominal wage rigidity in the United Kingdom”, Economic 
Journal (Conference Papers), 110. No. 462, pp. C176-C195. 
 
Svensson, L.E.O. [2000], “The Zero Bound in an Open Economy: A Foolproof Way 
of Escaping from a Liquidity Trap”, Monetary and Economic Studies (Special 
Edition), February, pp. 277-316. 
 
Taylor, John B. [2001], “Low Inflation, Deflation, and Policies for Future Price 
Stability”, Monetary and Economic Studies (Special Edition), February, pp. 35-51. 
 
Wolman, A. L. [1998], “Staggered Price Setting and the Zero Bound on Nominal 
Interest Rates,” Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly, 84, pp. 1-
24. 
 
Yaari, M. [1965], “The uncertain lifetime, life insurance and the theory of the 
consumer”, Review of Economic Studies, Vo.l 32, April, pp. 137-50. 
 
Yogo, Motohiro [2002], “Estimating the Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution when 































































































































































































































Real GDP Growth (%) CPI Inflation (%) Money Wage Growth (%)










































































































































































































































Short-term Interest Rate Long-term Interest Rate Equity Index (TOPIX, deflated by CPI, 1950=100, Second Axis)
Sources: UN Common Database and Bloomberg. 





















































































































































































Real GDP Growth (%) CPI Inflation (%) Money Wage Growth (%)













































































































































































































































Short-term Interest Rate Long-term Interest Rate Equity Index (DAX, deflated by CPI, 1976=100, Second Axis)
Sources: UN Common Database, Bundes Bank and Bloomberg. 
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Short-term Interest Rate Long-term Interest Rate Equity Index (FTSE, deflated by RPI, 1976=100, Second Axis)
Sources: UN Common Database, Bank of England and Bloomberg. 
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Total, Goods and Services Inflation in the UK 
 UK  US  Euro  area  Japan 
CPI  inflation*  1.9 1.7  2.2 -0.9 
CPI goods*  -1.1  -0.1  1.4  -1.6 
CPI  services*  4.6 3.1  3.3 0.0 
Services - goods inflation, 
1990-97 
1.6 1.6  1.6 1.3 
Services - goods inflation, 
1990-2002 
2.3 1.8  1.3 1.3 
* year to August 2002.   
Inflation rates are calculated as the total increase in the price index over the indicated period, based on 
monthly data , expressed as a twelve month growth rate. 
Sources: Table taken from King [2002]; ultimate source: ONS (for UK) and Thomson Financial 
Datastream for data on US, Euro Area and Japan. 
 
 